



HOW CHINA’S JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 




Studies frequently report significant divergence between 
institutional arrangements promoting judicial independence and 
judges’ actual independent behavior, particularly in authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian countries. Many believe that such divergence is 
especially likely in China, where the problem of judicial dependence is 
deeply embedded in local contexts and historical practices. Drawing 
on in-depth interviews with judges and lawyers from three provinces 
with diverse socioeconomic demographics, this Article assesses the 
judicial accountability reforms launched by the current Xi Jinping 
administration, which promise to empower individual judges to decide 
cases with minimal interference from superiors. Defying expectations, 
this Article finds that the reforms have enabled frontline judges to 
decide most cases without obtaining approval from court leaders and 
have limited the use of the powerful adjudication committees, making 
individual judges considerably more autonomous. It argues that what 
enabled this unexpected development is the regime’s recent power 
consolidation, which has put an end to China’s decades-old policy 
fragmentation and forces local agents to more faithfully implement the 
centrally mandated reform plans. The findings shed light on the 
relationship between the judges’ local embeddedness and the 
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macrostructural dynamics, and compel researchers to reevaluate the 
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In recent decades, courts have become increasingly important 
institutions for strengthening authoritarian rule.1 Moustafa summarizes 
several common ways in which courts can make an authoritarian 
 
1.  See, e.g., JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW : LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE, 
AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 46 (2012) (noting that in Singapore, law and courts haves been 
an imporant tool for “ the decimation of opposition parties[,] . . . the dismantling of independent 
media[,] . . . and the thwarting of an autonomous civil society.”); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER : LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
EGYPT 230 (2007) (describing that the Sadat regime established the Supreme Constitutional 
Court to attract foreign investment, because “[w]ith unchecked power, authoritarian regimes 
have difficulty providing credible commitments to the protection of property rights and therefore 
have difficulty stimulating private investment.”); Alexei Trochev, Legitimacy, Accountability 
and Discretion of the Russian Courts, in POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA 
123 (Martin Brusis, et al. eds., 2016) (noting that the Russian courts provide “a comfortably 
flawed instrument nonetheless able to lend a voice to aggrieved citizens without undermining 
the nature of the regime [and] provide a legal veil for . . . reigning in political opponents”); 
Hootan Shambayati, Courts in Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes: The Judicialization of 
Turkish (and Iranian) Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES 283, 284 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008) (describing the Turkish 
military limited the effectiveness of elected institutions by subjecting them to judicial review by 
the unelected and pro-military judiciary). 
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regime more resilient, including exercising control over opposition, 
advancing discipline within the bureaucracies, facilitating trade and 
investment, and bolstering regime legitimacy.2 To achieve these 
objectives, governments under authoritarian and hybrid regimes 
professionalize and empower judiciaries through institutional changes 
such as depoliticizing the appointment of judges3 and securing their 
jobs with life tenures.4 China joined this trend with its latest round of 
judicial reforms. Under the banner of “governing the country according 
to the law,” the Xi Jinping administration announced its plan to tackle 
the decades-old problem of judicial dependence through the centrally 
imposed judicial accountability reforms.5 Essentially, the reforms 
promise to empower judges to independently adjudicate cases with 
minimal interference from superiors and to hold these judges fully 
responsible for the cases they decide. 
Despite the various potential benefits listed by Moustafa, there are 
many reasons to be skeptical about such promises of judicial autonomy, 
especially from an authoritarian regime. Scholars point out that there is 
often a significant gap between formal institutional arrangements 
promoting judicial independence and judges’ actual autonomous 
behavior.6 For example, successive USSR and Russian leaders, 
including Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin, established and strengthened 
 
2.  Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. 
SCI. 281, 283 (2014). 
3.  Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of 
Politics in Egypt, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
132, 138–39 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008) (describing the appointment process 
of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, under which new justices were nominated by 
sitting justices). 
4.  PETER B. MAGGS ET AL., LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 159 
(6th ed. 2015). 
5.  Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, CCP Central Committee 
Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the 
Country According to the Law Forward, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA, 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-
concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-
according-to-the-law-forward/ [https://perma.cc/DVC4-PBZC] (last visited Oct 3, 2018). 
6.  See, e.g., Lisa Hilbink, The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence, 64 WORLD POL. 
587, 587–88 (2012) (claiming “a clear distinction between formal judicial autonomy—that is, 
formal or ‘negative’ judicial independence—and independent judicial behavior or ‘positive 
independence.’ The former refers to the rules [formal and informal] governing judicial 
appointment, discipline, tenure, jurisdiction, and budget, while the latter is behavioral.”); Daniel 
Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The Beginning of a New 
Millennium?, 40 TEX. INT. LAW J. 595, 597 (2005) (arguing that “formal independence is a 
singularly unhelpful construct, especially in the Latin American context.”). 
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various institutional mechanisms designed to insulate Russian judges 
from extrajudicial influences, including life tenure, non-politicized 
nomination and discipline systems, and financial and administrative 
autonomy.7 However, empirical evidence suggests that the notorious 
Soviet practice of “telephone law,” a system through which case 
outcomes come from orders issued over the phone by higher-ranking 
judges or government officials, remains widespread after more than a 
decade of continuous judicial reforms.8 There are many possible 
reasons for this divergence, such as too little political competition,9 a 
low level of political fragmentation within the government,10 and 
judicial passivism.11 
Bridging such a gap seems particularly daunting in the case of 
China. Since the launch of the judicial accountability reforms, the 
prevailing narrative has been one of deep skepticism, particularly given 
China’s huge size and diversity, its deep-rooted practice of judicial 
dependency, and the Western origin of the reforms’ design. Through 
empirical research, this Article challenges this narrative by 
demonstrating that the reforms have indeed made frontline judges 
significantly more independent in adjudicating the vast majority of 
court cases. It argues that such development is made possible not 
because China is becoming more democratic or liberal but—
ironically—because the regime’s increasingly authoritarian nature has 
enabled the central reformers to overcome the local embeddedness 
facing the reforms’ implementation. 
 
7.  MAGGS ET AL., supra note 4, at 159; Kathryn Hendley, The Role of Law, in PUTIN’S 
RUSSIA: PAST IMPERFECT, FUTURE UNCERTAIN 83, 85–86 (Stephen K Wegren ed., 2016). 
8.  Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 POST-SOVIET AFF. 324, 344 (2008). 
9.  See, e.g., J Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative 
Approach, xxiii J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 741–43 (1994) (claiming that “[i]f rational politicians face 
significant odds of being in the minority party . . . they will try to reduce the variance to their 
political returns . . . by insulating the judicial system from political control.” But politicians or 
parties that “could realistically expect to stay in power indefinitely . . . could rationally elect to 
monitor judges instead, and thereby obtain greater control over policy.”); but see Aylin Aydın, 
Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the Varying Impact of 
Political Competition, 47 LAW SOC. REV. 105, 105 (2013) (suggesting that “while in advanced 
democracies high levels of political competition enhances judicial independence, in developing 
democracies political competition significantly hampers the independence of the courts.”). 
10.  Brinks, supra note 6, at 620 (arguing that in polities where power is more fragmented, 
judges are more willing and able to challenge the government, as the latter is less able to retaliate 
against the courts.). 
11.  Hilbink, supra note 6, at 597 (suggesting that an attitude of judicial activism is crucial 
to “motivating positive judicial independence” and emboldening “a new cohort of judges to 
begin asserting their professional authority against powerful actors”). 
2020] OVERCOMING EMBEDDEDNESS 741 
II. ADVANCING JUDICIAL AUTONOMY IN CHINA: MISSION 
IMPOSSIBLE? 
The risk of divergence between formal rules promoting judicial 
autonomy and actual judicial behavior seems particularly significant in 
the Chinese context. For decades prior to the reforms, each Chinese 
judge had been deeply embedded in the pyramid-like administrative 
structure of his or her court.12 Under this structure, court leaders13 could 
control case outcomes through the case-approval system, which 
required frontline judges to seek court leaders’ approval for their drafts 
of court decisions before the decisions could take effect.14 If a case was 
considered legally complex, socially impactful, or politically sensitive, 
it would be submitted to an adjudication committee,15 who would then 
make a collective decision regarding the outcome.16 Besides making 
frontline judges dependent upon their superiors, this system of 
administrative hierarchy enabled court outsiders such as Communist 
Party officials to interfere in cases through their connections to court 
leaders.17 
By invoking the concept of embeddedness developed by scholars 
such as Polanyi and Granovetter,18 Ng and He rightfully question 
whether the current administration’s centrally imposed judicial 
accountability reforms can change such deep-rooted practices in the 
short term. They argue that “[d]espite the stated goal of the central 
government, institutional culture, local practices, and immediate 
concerns on the ground are more determinant in shaping the work of 
the grassroots courts. It is unlikely that the new rules that promote 
 
12.  Ranks of judges in a typical Chinese court include, in descending order, court 
president, vice-presidents, division chiefs of different divisions (e.g. civil, criminal 
administrative), vice-division chiefs, and frontline judges. 
13.  The court president, vice-presidents, division chiefs, and vice-division chiefs are 
considered to be “court leaders” in a Chinese court. 
14.  Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and 
Decision Making in a One-Party State, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 848, 858–59 (2012). 
15.  The adjudication committee, which consists of court leaders, is established in every 
Chinese court. It is charged with deciding legally complex/controversial, socially impactful, or 
politically sensitive cases. 
16.  KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN 
CHINA 91 (2017). 
17.  Li, supra note 14, at 858–61; Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts of 
Legitimacy in a Chinese Lower Court, 31 LAW SOC. INQUIRY 75, 94 (2006). 
18.  See generally Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOCIOL. 481 (1985); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION : THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed., Beacon 
2001). 
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individual responsibility will have any immediate tangible effects.”19 
Indeed, some scholars have argued that the vertical hierarchy, 
especially the adjudication committee system, could be advantageous 
in many local contexts. For example, Wang and Liu’s empirical work 
suggests that the adjudication committees can often help local courts 
reach acceptable compromises between political/social and legal 
considerations in troublesome cases.20 Zhu argues that the vertical 
hierarchy is necessary to maintain the quality of judicial decisions and 
a unified application of law within a single court, which often consists 
of hundreds of judges with diverse levels of professional quality.21 Zhu 
criticizes the accountability reform as an impractical plan based not on 
actual practice in China but on the foreign and small US federal court 
system and predicts that it is likely to fail.22 
Even some of the vertical hierarchy’s much-criticized 
disadvantages are likely to make the system more—rather than less—
resilient to change. According to He, the adjudication committee 
system provides both individual judges and committee members shelter 
from responsibility, as the collective nature of a committee’s decisions 
means that no single person can be held accountable in a case gone 
wrong.23 Li argues that Chinese courts’ vertical hierarchy and chain of 
command create institutionalized opportunities for corruption by all 
participants of the judicial decision-making process.24 Despite being 
harmful to society and the regime as a whole, these factors benefit 
judges and court leaders, giving them incentive to resist changes to the 
status quo. Taken together, there is good reason to suspect that “judges 
will find ways to adapt to the new rules of the game. The 
[accountability reforms], as always, will be observed nominally, but 
 
19.  NG & HE, supra note 16, at 197. 
20.  Lungang Wang & Sida Liu, Jiceng Fayuan Shenpan Weiyuanhui Yali Anjian Juece 
De Shizheng Yanjiu [An Empirical Study on How the Adjudication Committee in Basic-Level 
Courts Makes Decisions on Cases with External Pressure], 1 CHINESE J. L. 80, 96 (2017). 
21.  Suli Zhu, Jiceng Fayuan Shenpan Weiyuanhui Zhidu De Kaocha Ji Sikao 
[Investigation and Thoughts On The Adjudication Committee System In Basic Courts], PEKING 
UNIV. L. REV. 320, 336–37 (1998) [hereinafter Zhu, Investigation]; Suli Zhu, Sifa Gaige De 
Zhishi Xuqiu [Knowledge Demand of Judicial Reform], LAW MOD. 100, 102–03 (2017) 
[hereinafter Zhu, Knowledge]. 
22.  Zhu, Knowledge, supra note 21, at 102–04. 
23.  Xin He, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s Role in a 
Chinese Court, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 681, 706–08 (2012). 
24.  See Li, supra note 14, at 871. 
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whether they will be followed in substance remains an open 
question.”25 
These arguments, however, have overlooked the fact that such 
embeddedness is part of a multi-layered structure. Indeed, Granovetter 
himself has made clear in his seminal work that “the embeddedness 
argument is a rather proximate one” between “macrostructural 
circumstances” and individuals.26 As a result, answering any large-
scale questions about economic and political changes require not only 
appreciating the embeddedness in social networks, but also 
understanding the “larger cultural and political and economic 
phenomena at the macro level of institutions” in which social networks 
operate.27 
This is very much true in the case of the Chinese judiciary: just as 
judges are deeply embedded in the administrative hierarchy of their 
courts, the courts themselves—and the judiciary as a whole—are also 
embedded in the broader national political environment. Significant 
changes in the national power dynamics will inevitably affect how 
court leaders interact with frontline judges, especially when such 
interaction involves balancing national mandates with local contexts. 
Such a change has indeed taken place in China. Since taking office in 
2012, Xi Jinping has drastically consolidated his power by sending 
hundreds of thousands of public servants to prison on charges of 
corruption—a move that “signaled a zero tolerance approach to non-
compliance with central directives.”28 Such an approach has the 
potential to make local courts significantly more compliant about 
implementing the centrally mandated judicial reforms despite the deep 
administrative embeddedness. Therefore, as Hilbink suggests, a 
systematic empirical inquiry is necessary to evaluate the real-world gap 
between the formal institutional arrangements that promote judicial 
autonomy and actual judicial behavior.29 
Based on in-depth interviews with lawyers and judges from three 
Chinese provinces with diverse socioeconomic demographics, this 
Article marks the first systematic attempt to empirically describe and 
 
25.  NG & HE, supra note 16, at 197. 
26.  See Granovetter, supra note 18, at 506. 
27.  Greta Krippner et al., Polanyi Symposium: Aa Cconversation on Eembeddedness, 2 
SOCIO-ECON. REV. 109, 116 (2004); see also Granovetter, supra note 18, at 506. 
28.  Genia Kostka & Jonas Nahm, Central-Local Relations: Recentralization and 
Environmental Governance in China, 231 CHINA Q. 567, 568 (2017). 
29.  Hilbink, supra note 6, at 587–88 (arguing “[p]ositive judicial independence can be 
assessed only empirically”). 
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analyze the implementation and effect of the judicial accountability 
reforms. Partially inspired by the US federal court system, these 
reforms promise to strengthen individual judges’ autonomy and 
accountability, directly contradicting the traditional emphasis on 
collective decision-making in Chinese courts. Defying some of the 
predictions mentioned above, this Article finds that the reforms were, 
for the most part, earnestly implemented by local courts as assigned by 
the central government and the Supreme People’s Court. Moreover, the 
reforms have, at least in the short term, increased the autonomy of 
judges by enabling them to render judgements without prior approval 
from higher-ranking judges and by limiting the use of adjudication 
committees. These changes have not only reduced higher-ranking 
judges’ influence over most cases, but also weakened the key 
mechanisms that powerful outsiders use to interfere in judicial matters. 
The findings provide critical information on the recent development of 
the Chinese judiciary and compel researchers to reevaluate the role of 
the authoritarian state in shaping judicial behavior, especially in light 
of its increasingly authoritarian nature. This Article also contributes to 
the larger debate about the complex relationship between judiciaries 
and nondemocratic regimes. 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
This Article is based on interviews the Author conducted in China 
during summer 2018. Given the diversity of China’s various localities, 
the author’s fieldwork spanned three province-level units: Zhejiang, an 
affluent unit in the coastal region; Chongqing, a moderately prosperous 
unit in the inland region; and Yunnan, a relatively underdeveloped unit 
in the inland region. In each, the Author interviewed judges and 
lawyers to learn from their different perspectives. To facilitate 
meaningful comparisons between the pre- and post-reform courts, the 
Author chose to primarily interview judges and lawyers who had joined 
their respective practices prior to 2012 (i.e., before Xi Jinping became 
president). The Author interviewed judges in various positions ranging 
from judicial assistants (technically not judges) to court presidents, 
with the majority being frontline judges and division chiefs/vice-chiefs. 
Interviewee ages range from mid-twenties to mid-fifties, with roughly 
half born after 1980. The interviewed lawyers were associates and 
partners from law firms of various sizes, with larger law firms generally 
handling cases with larger stakes. 
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The composition of the interviews across the province-level units 
is as follows. In Zhejiang, fourteen interviews with judges were 
conducted in two basic courts and one intermediary court,30 and fifteen 
interviews with lawyers were conducted in one small, one medium, and 
one large law firm.31 In Chongqing, ten interviews were conducted in 
two basic courts, and ten interviews were conducted in one small and 
one large law firm. In Yunnan, ten interviews were conducted in two 
basic courts and one intermediary court, and eight interviews were 
conducted in one medium and one large law firm. Altogether, thirty-
four interviews with judges and thirty-three interviews with lawyers 
were conducted. Additionally, four courts included in this study were 
located outside developed areas. One Chongqing basic court, one 
Yunnan basic court, and one Yunnan intermediary court were located 
in relatively underdeveloped small cities, and another Chongqing basic 
court was located in an impoverished rural county that is a five-hour 
drive from Chongqing city. There is a possible urban bias in the sample, 
as courts in rural areas are generally considered to be less professional 
and more dependent upon local governments.32 
The interviews were semi-structured. The questions mostly 
focused on changes in the judiciary during Xi Jinping’s presidency, 
especially on the accountability reforms (责任制). Typical questions 
include: 
1. What is your position in the court (or law firm)? What is your 
practice area? 
2. When did you start working here? Did you have other legal 
experiences before joining? 
3. What measures have been taken with regard to the 
accountability reforms (责任制), such as “the one who handles the 
case will decide” (审理者裁判) and “the one who decides will be 
accountable” (裁判者负责)? 
 
30.  China has a four-level court system: the Supreme Court, high courts, intermediary 
courts, and basic courts. The basic courts are the courts of the first instance for most civil, 
criminal, and administrative cases. The jurisdiction of a basic court normally consists of a single 
town or municipal district. An intermediary court sits at the prefecture or municipality level, and 
handles appellate cases from the basic courts within its jurisdiction. It also serves as a court of 
first instance for cases that meet certain statutory threshold. 
31. In the Chinese context, a small law firm normally employs no more than 20 to 30 
attorneys and has only a single office. A big firm employs a minimum of 100 attorneys and has 
offices across multiple provinces. Medium firms are the ones in between the two extremes. 
32.  See NG & HE, supra note 16, at 193. 
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4. What do you think are the effects of the accountability 
reforms? 
5. How did the accountability reforms affect the role of external 
influences on court cases? 
This list of questions was for the Author’s reference only. The 
Author encouraged interviewees to speak freely on any related topics 
that they had deep knowledge about or were interested in discussing, 
and the Author sometimes asked follow-up questions not included on 
the list. Interviews with judges lasted around thirty to seventy-five 
minutes, and interviews with lawyers lasted around twenty to forty 
minutes. 
There are two main challenges in using interviews to evaluate the 
judicial reforms. First, the Xi Jinping administration considers the 
reforms an important part of its domestic policy.33 As a result, court 
officials are wary of producing “negative publicity” for the reforms that 
could be tracked to a specific court. Second, questions about external 
influences can potentially touch upon wrongdoing by interviewees or 
their colleagues. Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to 
expect interviewees to be completely forthcoming about these issues 
even if guaranteed anonymity. 
Several steps were taken to address these challenges. First, to 
protect not only the identities of the interviewed individuals but also 
the entities in which the interviews took place, interviewees and 
contacts were promised that the names of their cities and counties 
would not be mentioned in publications. This level of confidentiality 
facilitated the process of arranging interviews and encouraged more 
candid discussions. Second, in addition to interviewing judges, the 
author interviewed lawyers, who offered a somewhat more objective 
and candid perspective on the impacts of the reforms. Third, all 
interviews were arranged through scholars who worked at universities 
in the interviewees’ respective provinces and had long-term 
connections with the courts and law firms where the interviews were 
conducted. The connection and trust between the scholars and the 
entities helped ease the latter’s fear of negative publicity. However, as 
the interviewees were chosen by the entities to which they belonged, 
there is an inherent risk that the entities—especially the courts—picked 
individuals with views they deemed politically safe. Nonetheless, given 
 
33.  Jacques Delisle, Law in the China Model 2.0: Legality, Developmentalism and 
Leninism under Xi Jinping, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 68, 69 (2017). 
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that random sampling was not a feasible option, the abovementioned 
measures were the best available to the Author in obtaining information 
from as many interviewees as possible. 
To preserve anonymity, the interviewees’ names have been coded 
as two letters and two digits (e.g., JA01 or LA01) according to the 
following method. The first letter (J or L) denotes judge or lawyer, 
representing the occupation of the interviewee. The second letter is a 
province-level unit code representing the location of the interview 
(Zhejiang: A, Chongqing: B, Yunnan: C). The digits that follow 
indicate the interview number. 
IV. POLICY BACKGROUND 
The judicial accountability reforms are part of a comprehensive 
judicial reform launched by the Xi Jinping administration since 2013.34 
In 2013, the third plenum of the 18th Communist Party (“CCP”) 
Central Committee issued a decision laying out a broad roadmap for 
judicial reforms.35 This blueprint was reconfirmed and elaborated 
during the fourth plenum of the CCP Central Committee in 2014, the 
first high-profile meeting dedicated to “governing the country 
according to the law.”36 In June 2014, the Central Leading Group for 
Comprehensively Deepening Reform, a Party body headed by Xi 
Jinping, officially authorized the implementation of the reforms in six 
provinces (these were expanded to the remaining provinces in 2015).37 
While the Party was in charge of the reforms, much of the actual design 
 
34.  Besides the judicial accountability reforms, which primarily concern the relationship 
between frontline judges and the court leaders, the overall judicial reform also includes measures 
addressing the courts’ dependency on local governments (“the judicial centralization reforms”) 
and issues involving the judicial professionalism (“the judicial personnel reforms”). For a 
detailed description on these reforms, see Yueduan Wang, “Detaching” Courts From Local 
Politics? Assessing Judicial Centralization Reforms In China (under review) (on file with 
author); Yueduan Wang, Reevaluating “Countermeasure from Below”: Evidences from Judicial 
Personnel Reforms, Peking U. L. J. (forthcoming 2020). 
35.  Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, CHINA.ORG.CN (2014), 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602_9.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VS7B-QGXF] (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
36.  Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, supra note 5. 
37.  Weihan Yang, Zhongyang Jueding Zai Shanghai Guangdong Deng Liu Shengshi 
Shidian Sifa Gaige [The Party Center Decides To Test Judicial Reform In Guangdong And 
Other Five Provinces], CAIXIN.COM (June 16, 2014, 7:59 AM), http://china.caixin.com/2014-
06-16/100690795.html [https://perma.cc/SRQ7-K4S5]. 
748 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:4 
and implementation work was entrusted to the Supreme People’s Court 
and its Leadership Group for Judicial Reforms, which was headed by 
Court President Zhou Qiang.38 It was also stipulated that any “pilot 
programs” related to the judicial reforms implemented by the 
provincial high courts must be first approved by the Court or the central 
government,39 thus ensuring that reform designs were uniform and 
centralized. In 2015, the Court promulgated the Opinions on 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of People’s Courts, which 
laid out specific reform measures for the entire judiciary.40 These 
include a series of reforms on the “judicial accountability system” (or 
“the accountability reforms”).41 
The principle goal of the accountability reforms is to ensure that 
the “one who tries the case shall have the power to decide the case and 
be responsible for his decision.”42 Specifically, these reforms promise 
to: (1) deprive court leaders of the power to review and sign court 
opinions drafted by frontline judges, (2) substantially reduce the use of 
adjudication committees, (3) establish “conferences of professional 
judges” that provide frontline judges with non-binding advice on the 
application of law, (4) establish a system that records “interference with 
cases by court insiders,” and (5) develop a system of “lifelong 
accountability for the quality of cases” that holds judges accountable 
for cases they adjudicate.43 
Interestingly, despite the regime’s official rejection of Western 
ideology, the judicial reforms seem to have deep Western – indeed, 
American – roots. Judges reported during their interviews that they 
were told these reforms were inspired by the US federal court system. 
For example, an intermediary court judge shared that he learned during 
a meeting with officials from the Supreme People’s Court that “there 
were a bunch of people who came back from the US in the Office of 
 
38.  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, ZHONGGUO FAYUAN DE SIFA GAIGE: 2013-
2018 [JUDICIAL REFORM OF CHINESE COURTS: 2013-2018] 7 (2019). 
39.  Id. at 7. 
40.  Supreme People’s Court of China, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Quanmian 
Shenhua Renmin Fayuan Gaige De Yijian [Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Comprehensive Deepening of Reform of People’s Courts], CHINACOURT.ORG (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2015/02/id/148096.shtml [https://perma.cc/SP6G-
PY5T] (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
41.  Id. 
42.  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, ZHONGGUO FAYUAN DE SIFA GAIGE: 2013-
2016 [JUDICIAL REFORM OF CHINESE COURTS: 2013-2016] 30 (2017). 
43.  See id. at 30–33. 
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Judicial Reforms.44 They made the current plan for judicial reforms 
mainly based upon the US federal court system.”45 While there is no 
official account to validate this statement,46 it does offer a plausible 
hypothesis for why China has chosen to move from its traditional 
emphasis on collective decision-making to emphasizing the power and 
responsibility of individual judges,47 an approach more commonly 
associated with Anglo-American legal systems.48 Such connection is 
especially ironic given Chief Justice Zhou Qiang—the head of the 
Chinese judiciary and the public face of the recent judicial reforms—
publicly announced in the midst of the reforms that “We should 
resolutely resist erroneous influence from the West: ‘constitutional 
democracy,’ ‘separation of powers’ and ‘independence of the 
judiciary.’ We must make clear our stand and dare to show the 
sword.”49 However, such divergence between political rhetoric and 
actual policies may have been a necessary tactic, as demonstration of 
political loyalty is likely a prerequisite for the Party’s support of the 
reforms, especially since the reforms have sensitive Western origins.50 
 
44.  For example, He Fan, one of chief authors of the Supreme Court’s plan on the judicial 
reforms, have translated multiple books on the US federal court system and even drafted a book 
named Essays on US Supreme Court. See Wei Gao & Hua Qin, Supreme People’s Court 
Comrade He Fan’s Deeds, CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015, 5:23 PM), 
http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2015/0915/c399092-27588729.html [https://perma.cc/9WGX-
FQUX]. 
45.  Interview with JC10, Judge, Intermediary People’s Court, in Yunnan, China (July 13, 
2018). 
46.  Several Chinese legal scholars with connections with the Supreme People’s Court 
also confirmed this connection between the judicial reforms and US federal court system during 
conversation with the author. 
47.  See Ray Worthy Campbell & Fu Yulin, Moving target: the regulation of judges in 
China’s rapidly evolving legal system, in REGULATING JUDGES 105, 105, 114–15 (Richard 
Devlin & Adam Dodek eds., 2016). 
48.  See, e.g.,. Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of 
Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 432 (1966); Michael Kirby, Judicial dissent - common 
law and civil law traditions, 123 LAW Q. REV. 379 (2007). 
49.  Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and 
Reformers Wince, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courts-zhou-qiang.html 
[https://perma.cc/DUR4-5XQG]. 
50.  See Benjamin L Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 620, 
627 (2007), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20192809?seq=1#metadata [https://perma.cc/E3VH-
279H] (info tab contents) (arguing that judicial reforms in China “may be possible precisely 
because the courts are not a challenge to Party authority.”). 
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V.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY REFORMS 
A. The Reform Measures and Their Implementation 
The judicial accountability reforms generally aim to increase the 
independence of individual judges or judge panels from their superiors 
in the courts. Prior to the reforms, most court opinions had to be co-
signed by either a department division chief or one of the court 
presidents/vice-presidents. Cases with higher stakes often went to 
adjudication committees, which consist mostly of court leaders. Li 
identifies this mechanism as one of the key components of the 
systematic corruption that once characterized Chinese courts because 
it “allow[ed] corrupt [court leaders] to control the outcome of a much 
greater number of cases of interest.”51 
Formally, the reforms have completely eliminated this case 
approval system. In the words of the Supreme Court, the reforms 
“revoked the system of asking for instructions and examination and 
approval level by level [and] established [in its place] the system that 
one who tries a case shall have the power to decide the case and be 
responsible for his decision.”52 Prior to the reform, it was standard 
practice in most courts to have either a division chief or a 
president/vice-president co-sign an opinion before it became effective. 
One judge described the approval system in his court prior to the 
reforms this way: “Before the reform, all cases must be approved by 
division chiefs or president/vice presidents. Initially, all cases must go 
through both a division chief and a president/vice-president. Later, 
simple cases needed to be approved by division chiefs, and other cases 
were approved by vice-presidents or a full-time member of the 
judiciary committee.”53 Normally, an opinion could not be issued 
without going through a similar approval process. Under the new 
reforms, however, a court opinion becomes effective immediately after 
it is signed by the judge or the judicial panel that tried the case.54 In 
effect, the new system closes the primary institutional channel through 
which court leadership previously influenced the outcomes of 
 
51.  Li, supra note 14, at 860. 
52.  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 30. 
53.  Interview with JC03, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Yunnan, China (July 10, 2018). 
54.  See, e.g., Interview with JA01, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 
6, 2018); Interview with JC02, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Yunnan, China (July 10, 2018). 
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individual cases. As this Article discusses later, court leaders can still 
use informal means to convey their preferences in important cases 
under the new system, but the elimination of the formal approval 
system has made it harder—and thus less worthwhile—for leaders to 
interfere with their subordinates’ cases under most circumstances. 
The accountability reforms have also limited the scope of the 
adjudication committees’ review of cases. According to the Supreme 
Court, “[i]n addition to the cases required by the law and the major and 
complicated cases involving foreign affairs, security and social 
stability of the State, the adjudication committees shall focus on the 
application of law in major, difficult, and complicated cases.”55 In other 
words, the adjudication committees are generally not supposed to 
interfere with case fact-finding unless a case involves “foreign affairs, 
security and social stability of the State.”56 It also means that the 
adjudication committees are not supposed to take a case simply because 
it involves large sums of money. In 2019, the Court stated that as a 
result of the reform, “the number of cases submitted to the judicial 
committees in the people’s courts at all levels for discussion has 
decreased significantly,” sometimes by more than forty percent.57 
Many interviewed judges confirmed that adjudication committees are 
indeed utilized much less frequently since the reforms.58 For example, 
one criminal judge said: “the adjudication committee now rarely 
discusses criminal cases. In the past, many cases had to be reported to 
the adjudication committee. Now, every year, there are only single-
digit [numbers of cases reported].”59 Similarly, a court leader reported: 
The functioning of the adjudication committee indeed changed a 
lot . . . The number of cases handled by the adjudication 
committee has been significantly reduced. Before the reform, 
whenever judges were unsure about a case, they would bring it to 
the adjudication committee. Now, in principle, the case handlers 
are responsible for the cases themselves . . . Nowadays the 
adjudication committee only focuses on difficult matters of law. In 
 
55.  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 32. 
56.  Id. at 32. 
57.  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 81. 
58.  See, e.g., Interview with JA05, Staff of the Political Department, Basic People’s 
Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 6, 2018); Interview with JB06, Judge and Vice Division chief 
of the 1st Civil Division, Basic People’s Court, in Chongqing, China (June 27, 2018); Interview 
with JC06, Judge and Member of the Adjudication Committee, Basic People’s Court, in Yunnan, 
China (July 11, 2018). 
59.  Interview with JC03, supra note 53. 
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the past, difficult matters of fact could also come to the 
committee . . . The problems in most cases are matters of fact, so 
this also blocked a large number [of cases from entering the 
adjudication committee].60 
To compensate for the elimination of the approval process and the 
reduced function of the adjudication committees, many courts have 
established so-called “conferences of professional judges” (专业法官
会议). The function of these conferences include “provid[ing] the 
collegiate panels with advice on correct application of law and opinions 
for their reference” and “filt[ering] the cases submitted to the 
adjudication committee.”61 A court usually has multiple conferences 
on various subjects, with civil, criminal, and administrative law each 
having its own conference.62 Each conference includes judges not only 
within the relevant departments, but also from other departments that 
focus on a related subject.63 For example, administrative law judges 
might be included in the civil law conference, as civil disputes can 
involve governmental actions.64 The judges or judicial panels have the 
power to decide whether to submit a case to the judicial conference. 
When they do, it is mostly because a case is too complex or the judges 
on the panel disagree on the outcome. The conference can then give its 
opinions, but such opinions are advisory and non-binding—the judges 
or judicial panels that submit the cases are, at least in theory, free to 
take or reject the conference’s opinions and remain fully accountable 
for these cases.65 The voluntary nature of the conferences has led to 
complaints that some bold judges will refuse to submit complex cases 
to the conferences, which could increase the number of erroneous 
decisions.66 
Although the Supreme Court has called for establishing 
conferences of professional judges, the implementation does not seem 
to be universal. Those judges who reported frequent utilization of the 
 
60.  Interview with JA06, Judge and Director of the Trial Administration Office, Basic 
People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 7, 2018). 
61.  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 31–32. 
62.  Interview with JA07, Judge and Vice Division chief of 2nd Civil Division, Basic 
People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 7, 2018). 
63.  See id. 
64.  See id. 
65.  Id.; Interview with JA09, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 9, 
2018). 
66.  Interview with JB04, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Chongqing, China (June 22, 
2018); Interview with JB09, Judge and Division Chief of Small-Subject Division, Basic People’s 
Court, in Chongqing, China (June 27, 2018). 
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system generally consider it quite useful.67 They expressed that the 
conferences not only provide professional advice to individual judges 
on difficult cases, but also help relieve the pressure of important or 
controversial cases.68 Some courts utilize the formal conference 
infrequently due to the difficulty of assembling large numbers of judges 
from multiple departments.69 Instead, these courts set up informal 
conferences consisting of judges within a single department, which 
perform roughly the same function as the formal conferences.70 
Regardless of the conference formalities, the judges confirmed that 
conference recommendations are always advisory and that judges 
themselves remain fully accountable for their cases.71 
The reforms have also attempted to strengthen the independence 
of judges by introducing “the system of recording and affixing 
responsibilities for interference with cases by insiders of judicial 
organs.”72 Each court is tasked with establishing a special database 
within the case management platform.73 Judges are required to record 
any “interference with cases by insiders . . . outside the legal 
procedures or relevant working procedures,”74 including the names of 
those interfering and the specific nature of the interference. Not a single 
judge interviewed, however, reported actually using this system or 
knowing of a colleague who had. But several judges observed that the 
mere existence of the system makes a difference. As one judge 
explained: 
Although I do not know anyone who actually recorded [any 
interference], this mechanism functions as an invisible claw. If a 
leader wants to interfere, he will have to think twice because it is 
the right of the judge to record. If the judge is determined to record, 
then no one can stop him or her.75 
With increased power comes increased accountability, at least in 
theory. The Supreme Court states that “a judge shall be responsible for 
 
67.  E.g. Interview with JA07, supra note 62; Interview with JA08, Judge, Basic People’s 
Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 7, 2018). 
68.  Interview with JA07, supra note 62. 
69.  Interview with JB01, Judge and Director of the Research Office, Basic People’s 
Court, in Chongqing, China (June 22, 2018); Interview with JC06, supra note 58. 
70.  Interview with JB01, supra note 69; Interview with JC02, supra note 54. 
71.  Interview with JB01, supra note 69. 
72.  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40, at 33. 
73.  Id. at 33. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Interview with JA07, supra note 62. 
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his/her performance of duties of adjudication and for the quality of 
cases handled by him/her for life.”76 However, during the interviews, 
judges indicated that with the exception of several high-profile 
wrongful convictions in criminal cases, there are no concrete policies 
setting exactly how to measure the quality of cases or how a judge will 
be held responsible for his or her performance.77 That being said, for 
some (but not all) judges, the mere term lifelong accountability and the 
fact that they can no longer share accountability with their superiors 
add pressure.78 One judge complained: “After the lifelong 
[accountability] system, judges universally reported that [we feel] more 
responsibility for [our] cases. In the past, [we] had insomnia. Now, [we] 
have anxiety.”79 
B. Evaluating the Reforms: Views from Judges and Lawyers 
The judges almost unanimously recognized that the accountability 
reforms empower them to handle their cases more independently, 
particularly due to the elimination of the case approval system. Many 
judges characterized their post-reform role as “independent judging,”80 
“complete independent handling of cases,”81 “personal judging,”82 or 
“the last gate.”83 One criminal law judge described the difference like 
this: 
In criminal cases, there used to be . . . outside interferences. After 
the reforms . . . interference by leaders is basically a non-issue. I 
personally have never encountered [any interference] after the 
judicial reforms. The main reason is that now the presiding judges 
themselves are the ones who decide.84 
Even the less optimistic judges recognized that the reforms have made 
them more independent. For example, one judge said: 
 
76.  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA, supra note 40. 
77.  Interview with JA08, supra note 67. 
78.  E.g. Interview with JA01, supra note 54; Interview with JA07, supra note 62; 
Interview with JB03, Judge and Director of the Trial Administration Office, Basic People’s 
Court, in Chongqing, China (June 22, 2018). 
79.  Interview with JA05, supra note 58. 
80.  Interview with JA01, supra note 54. 
81.  Interview with JA03, Judge, Basic People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 6, 2018). 
82.  Interview with JB07, Judge and Division Head of 1st Civil Division, Basic People’s 
Court, in Chongqing, China (June 27, 2018). 
83.  Interview with JC02, supra note 54. 
84.  Interview with JC03, supra note 53. 
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It is hard to avoid all external interference. But now the person 
making the final decision is different. In the past, if the division 
chief did not agree, he or she could refuse to sign on the opinion. 
Now [the division chief] can only come to speak [with the 
presiding judge]. This is a matter of degree, but things are indeed 
better than before.85 
Some judges from more developed regions, however, stated that the 
elimination of the approval process has had limited impact because 
they rarely encountered interference from superiors before the 
reform.86 One judge from a big-city court explained: “The rule-of-law 
environment is relatively good in our place . . . There have been few 
instances of leaders interfering with cases.”87 
Like the judges, most of the interviewed lawyers said that the 
reforms have generally made judges more autonomous in adjudicating 
cases. Among the thirty lawyers who were asked to comment on the 
effect of the accountability reforms, twenty-four answered that the 
reforms have resulted in greater judicial independence and less external 
influence on their cases,88 and five answered that there had been little 
or no difference and that external influence remained a problem.89 One 
criminal lawyer from Zhejiang answered that she felt that criminal law 
cases, “unlike in civil law [cases],” had not been seriously influenced 
by external factors since the early 2000s.90 
Many lawyers pointed to the elimination of the approval process 
as the most important factor contributing to increased independence. 
Specifically, they mentioned that (1) eliminating the approval process 
has made it much harder for court leaders to intercede in cases and (2) 
judges are less willing than before to let improper requests influence 
 
85.  Interview with JB03, supra note 78. 
86.  Interview with JA04, Judge and Vice Division Chief of the Administrative Division, 
Basic People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 6, 2018); Interview with JC07, Judge, Basic 
People’s Court, in Yunnan, China (July 11, 2018). 
87.  Interview with JA07, supra note 62. 
88.  Lawyers who responded this way include: LA02, LA03, LA05, LA06, LA07, LA08, 
LA09, LA10, LA11, LA13, LA14, LB05, LB06, LB07, LB08, LB09, LB10, LC01, LC02, LC04, 
LC05, LC06, LC07, LC08. 
89.  Lawyer who responded this way include: LB01, LB02, LB03, LB04, LC03. 
90.   Interview with LA12, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Zhejiang, China (June 5, 
2018). She said: “When I first became a lawyer in the 1990s, there were many meal gatherings 
with judges. Back then, restaurants just started to pop up, and the management [of judicial 
corruption] was not very strict. After 2000, there were a series of ‘red alerts’ aimed at regulating 
the relationship between judges and lawyers, and we began to become more ‘formal.’” 
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their opinions because they are now fully accountable. One lawyer’s 
words are especially representative: 
[The accountability reform] was helpful in reducing outside 
interference. Before the reforms, some cases had few disputes and 
the judges agreed with our opinions. But when the decisions were 
rendered, they turned out to be the complete opposite and were 
totally unexpected. Such [cases] were definitely problematic. In 
the past few years, such [a] situation has become very rare. After 
the reforms, there were very few requests and little interference 
from above . . . When I first entered the profession [around 2011], 
lawyers did not rely on their skills, but rather relied on their 
guanxi91 with the courts. Now there are significantly fewer such 
lawyers, and those left are having a hard time. That path has 
closed. Guanxi may still allow you to learn about the progress of 
your cases, but it cannot affect the [judges’] views of the facts and 
the final decisions.92 
Another lawyer elaborated on how the reforms have influenced judges’ 
independence from superiors: 
Nowadays, [court] leaders interfere less frequently because [such 
interferences] are not as useful as before. After the reforms, even 
if they do interfere, the judges can still decide the cases themselves 
because they no longer need the leaders’ signatures to render 
decisions . . . Whatever the leaders do, the judges will normally 
just pay some lip service to give face to the leaders and decide the 
cases in the way they should be decided. After all, there is the 
system of lifelong accountability—the responsibility is on the 
judges themselves.93 
The lawyers who expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of 
the reforms in reducing external influence mostly focused on the fact 
that court leaders maintain strong informal influence over frontline 
 
91.  Guanxi is the pinyin Romanization of the Chinese word 关系, meaning “connection” 
or “relationship.” It means, among many things, the personal relationship cultivated by an 
individual with other individuals, especially with persons of power. For a more detailed 
discussion on guanxi and judicial decision-making in China, see Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, “It 
Must Be Rock Strong!”: Guanxi’s Impact on Judicial Decision Making in China, 65 AM. J. 
COMP. LAW 841 (2017). 
92.  Interview with LC08, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Yunnan, China (July 12, 
2018). 
93.  Interview with LA13, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Zhejiang, China (June 5, 
2018). 
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judges.94 Such informal influence is largely rooted in the court leaders’ 
power over their subordinates’ promotions.95 However, these lawyers 
recognized that this form of informal interference is reserved for 
exceptionally large cases, which constitute a small fraction of the cases 
handled by the courts. As one lawyer explained: 
At this point, the impact of the accountability reforms still does 
not seem obvious. The influence of external factors is still very 
significant. The saying goes that “small cases depend on law, mid-
sized cases depend on guanxi, and large cases depend on 
politics” . . . However, after the reforms, if the judge insists on a 
specific result, then the leaders have no way to force him or her to 
change the decision. But such insistence will be disadvantageous 
to him/her in the longer term, as it will negatively affect his/her 
guanxi with the leaders.96 
Some lawyers painted a more balanced picture of the situation based 
on their experiences with regular and large cases. One said: 
The accountability reforms had a very large impact on the judges. 
In the past, those from above often interceded in cases. Now, even 
if [they] intercede, the judges will be much more careful, as they 
are now accountable [for the cases] themselves . . . If the value of 
the subject matter is large, there will still be interference. In the 
past, there was interference, no matter [how] large or small [the 
case].97 
Another lawyer reported: 
After the accountability reforms, there are fewer external factors 
[in cases] . . . But there are still problems in large cases . . . 
Sometimes, in order to deal with these situations, we will also find 
someone [to intercede on behalf of our client]. But normally, such 
situations will only happen in large cases, not in cases involving 
only hundreds of thousands or a couple million [RMBs].98 
 
94.  See e.g., Interview with LB03, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China 
(June 20, 2018); Interview with LB04, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China 
(June 20, 2018). 
95.  See Interview with LB01, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China (June 
20, 2018); Interview with LB04, supra note 94. 
96.  Interview with LB04, supra note 94. 
97.  Interview with LB07, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China (June 
28, 2018). 
98.  Interview with LB09, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China (June 
28, 2018). 
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Notably, even in some large cases, judges are increasingly unwilling to 
violate clear-cut rules or procedures, as the reforms have made them 
personally accountable for such behaviors. For example, one 
administrative law lawyer explained: 
In administrative cases, even though the government will still try 
to influence the court, it is obviously less useful than before . . . 
For example, I do a lot of house demolition cases. Nowadays, if 
there are any procedural defects in the government’s demolition 
process, then the court will not help the government . . . After all, 
judges are now accountable for their own cases, and the cases are 
uploaded online.99 
On the other hand, some lawyers expressed concern that the 
increased discretion of individual judges makes it more likely that the 
judges themselves—rather than their superiors—will be influenced by 
external factors. For example, one lawyer said: “Now the judge himself 
or herself makes the final decision. In the past, [we] needed to co-opt 
the division chiefs and the presidents. Now, some judges might say that 
‘all you need to do is co-opt me.’ There is a problem of too much 
power.”100 Among the thirty interviewed lawyers, eight mentioned this 
as a concern, but six of those nonetheless maintained that the reforms 
have made a positive change to the overall impartiality of the judiciary. 
One lawyer stated: “In terms of independence, [the reforms] only 
reduce interference from superiors but cannot completely eliminate 
[the judges’] personal connections with the outside world. But overall, 
there is an improvement compared to before the reforms.”101 In 
addition, several lawyers also mentioned that young judges tend to be 
more “formal,” “just,” and “valuing of the law” compared to their 
senior counterparts.102 Before the reforms, the opinions produced by 
these junior judges were subjected to the approval of their superiors, 
who were mostly senior judges. With the removal of the approval 
system, younger judges have reaped the substantial benefits of 
individual empowerment, which reduces the prevalence of interference 
by court superiors. 
 
99.  Interview with LB07, supra note 97. 
100.  Interview with LC01, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Yunnan, China (July 9, 
2018). 
101.  Interview with LA08, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Zhejiang, China (June 
4, 2018). 
102.  See, e.g., Interview with LB09, supra note 98; Interview with LB10, Partner, 
Anonymous Law Firm, in Chongqing, China (June 28, 2018). 
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The accountability system has also created some problems with 
the quality of court opinions. Some judges appreciated the old case 
approval system because it functioned as a safeguard, whereby the 
professionally more capable court leaders would check opinions for 
potential errors or deficiencies.103 Some young judges in particular 
miss the approval system, as they often lack the experience and 
confidence to decide more complex or consequential cases on their 
own.104 Indeed, some judges complained that the abolition of the 
approval system has resulted in more “erroneous” cases. For example, 
one intermediary court judge said: 
Particularly for us intermediary courts, the bad thing [about the 
accountability reforms] is that we are increasingly overruling or 
reversing [basic court decisions], which rarely happened in the 
past. The main thing is that young judges have little experience . . . 
In the past, there were people who could check [their opinions], so 
[young judges] were less likely to make mistakes.105 
Lawyers also expressed concerns about the reforms’ impact on the 
quality of judges’ decisions. Some lawyers conveyed that the new 
system gives too much discretion to judges with less experience or 
capability. One lawyer complained: 
Nowadays, [judges] are very powerful, so the judges’ professional 
qualities need to be relatively high. For example, many young 
judges have never married themselves, but are deciding divorce 
cases by themselves. [They] have no idea about the messy and 
complicated things in a marriage, so it is hard for them to 
understand the circumstances of such cases.106 
Another echoed this sentiment: 
Nowadays, there are too many court opinions that simply lack 
common sense. This is all because the judges are now deciding 
[cases] by themselves. We have now secured the judges’ 
independence in deciding cases but not their competences in legal 
skills. This is because whether one can join the judge quota 
depends on a lot of factors, not just on the candidate’s legal skills. 
In the past, we still had the presidents and division chiefs to ensure 
 
103.  Interview with JB09, supra note 66. 
104.  Interview with JA09, supra note 65. 
105.  Interview with JA12, Judge, Intermediary People’s Court, in Zhejiang, China (June 
8, 2018). 
106.  Interview with LA11, Associate, Anonymous Law Firm, in Zhejiang, China (June 
5, 2018). 
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the quality [of court opinions]. Now, too many cases are arbitrarily 
decided.107 
The old approval system also helped the courts mitigate the 
problem of inconsistent rulings because the division chiefs and 
presidents/vice-presidents would try to ensure that similar cases 
produced similar results across different judges in the same court.108 
One lawyer said: 
Because judges’ professional levels vary a lot, personal 
accountability will lead to a severe problem of “similar cases 
treated differently.” There was one court that decided similar 
situations in four different ways, making our predictions of case 
results very difficult. In general, the independent judgment 
[system] has made judges too powerful.109 
VI. OVERCOMING LOCAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
How do the reforms overcome judges’ deep-rooted embeddedness 
in the administrative hierarchy? To answer this question, one must first 
answer another: why do local contexts matter in the first place? In other 
words, why can’t the central government always get its preferred 
policies implemented regardless of local resistances? The explanation 
lies in the multi-layered nature of the system: just as a judge is 
embedded in the court’s administrative hierarchy, that court is situated 
in the broader political dynamic that includes many local and central 
actors. From the start of Reform and Opening in the late 1970s through 
early 2010, the state of Chinese politics was characterized by two 
general features: horizontally, political power in the center was often 
shared by rivaling factions, each with its own power bases and spheres 
of influence in different localities or bureaucracies;110 and vertically, 
economic and political power was decentralized to such extent that 
some scholars even termed the structure “federalism, China style” or 
 
107.  Interview with LC07, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Yunnan, China (July 12, 
2018). 
108.  E.g. Interview with JA04, supra note 86; Interview with JC03, supra note 53. 
109.  Interview with LA08, supra note 101. 
110.  For a more detailed discussion about factional dynamic in China, see VICTOR C 
SHIH, FACTIONS AND FINANCE IN CHINA : ELITE CONFLICT AND INFLATION (2008); CHENG LI, 
CHINESE POLITICS IN THE XI JINPING ERA: REASSESSING COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP (2016); 
Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s Economic 
Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505 (2006). 
2020] OVERCOMING EMBEDDEDNESS 761 
“de facto federalism.”111 Such fragmentation of authority unavoidably 
led to fragmentation in policy implementation. The popular phrase 
“where there is a policy from above, there is a countermeasure from 
below” (上有政策，下有对策) accurately captures the disjointed 
decision-making of the central and local governments during this 
period.112 Under such “fragmented authoritarianism,”113 it would be 
almost guaranteed that the judicial accountability reforms would be 
implemented unevenly across China, with many courts only nominally 
observing the reform measures. 
However, Xi Jinping’s surprisingly effective power consolidation 
changed the rules of the game, resulting in the unexpectedly earnest 
implementation of these reforms. After taking power in late 2012, Xi 
surprised almost all observers by launching the largest anti-corruption 
campaign in the People’s Republic’s history. Between 2013 and 2016, 
over 200,000 officials were indicted on corruption-related charges, and 
over 180,000 were tried and convicted.114 Among the convicts were 
both tigers and flies, terms respectively referring to Xi’s powerful 
factional rivals in the center and low-level public servants in the 
localities.115 The move effectively put an end to the decades-old 
political fragmentation of China’s authoritarian system, as officials 
across China have been subdued by the continuing campaign, “fearful 
lest the monitoring eye of Beijing come scrutinizing past abuses of 
power.”116 The anti-corruption crackdown significantly reduced local 
officials’ powers and discretion and signaled that the center would no 
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longer tolerate non-compliance with its key priorities.117 For example, 
local governments once had final say in environmental policies, often 
prioritizing economic development over environmental goals; in recent 
years, however, the central government has significantly centralized 
the enforcement mechanisms and begun to hold local officials 
criminally liable for oversights, resulting in “considerable 
improvements in many domains such as air pollution control, 
renewable energies and electric vehicles.”118 
As part of this trend, local courts have little choice but to comply 
with the judicial reform plans repeatedly endorsed by the central 
government and Xi Jinping himself. During the interviews, multiple 
judges confirmed that there was heavy political pressure from higher 
courts and the central government to implement the judicial reform 
plans in a timely and faithful manner, with no regard to oppositions 
from local court leaders.119 The implementation of the accountability 
reforms is by no means alone in this sense. Besides the judicial reforms, 
the Xi Jinping administration also launched a campaign to promote the 
autonomy of the courts vis-à-vis the local governments and Party 
apparatuses, which is another embeddedness issue that has been 
haunting the Chinese judiciary for decades.120 According to 
interviewed judges and lawyers, although the dependency problem is 
far from being solved, local officials’ willingness to intervene in court 
cases has decreased considerably since 2013 due to the fear of “getting 
caught.”121 One judge even reported that a local officer was removed 
from his position for exerting pressure on the court during an 
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administrative litigation involving his agency.122 Indeed, many judges 
complained that the local governments’ increasing unwillingness to 
actively get involved in socially impactful cases (such as cases 
involving housing demolition) is hurting the courts’ ability to mitigate 
the social conflicts underlying these cases. 123 
Such developments echo the view that embeddedness analysis is 
only the intermediate level in a multi-layered structure. According to 
Granovetter, embeddedness in social networks serves as a “middle 
ground between larger cultural and political and economic phenomena 
at the macro level of institutions and individuals at the other side . . . 
through which all these connections were flowing back and forth.”124 
Therefore, it is impossible to accurately predict the result of large-scale 
social or political projects without paying sufficient attention to 
changes on the macroscopic level. Some of the more pessimistic views 
about the reforms overemphasize social networks while overlooking 
the political macrostructure: Xi Jinping administration’s power 
consolidation has put tremendous political pressure on local courts to 
earnestly carry out central directives, which leads to the steadfast 
implementation of the judicial reform plans. This causal link perfectly 
illustrates Granovetter’s point on embeddedness: broad political 
changes can have dramatic effects on the operations of local social 
networks, and consequently on the behaviors of individuals embedded 
in them. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Drawing on evidence from fieldwork in courts and law firms, this 
Article examines the implementation and impact of the judicial 
accountability reforms under Xi Jinping. For the most part, these 
reforms were implemented across the regions investigated, and they 
have largely eliminated the case approval system, under which a court 
opinion drafted by a judge or judicial panel must be co-signed by a 
court leader before taking effect. As part of the reforms, the 
adjudication committees, which consist of court leaders and were 
previously used to determine important cases in lieu of frontline judges, 
are now also utilized much less frequently. Instead, many courts have 
established “conferences of professional judges” on different subjects 
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of law to provide judges with advice on difficult cases. Unlike the 
directives provided through the case-approval and adjudication-
committee procedures, the advice of the conferences is non-binding, 
and judges themselves remain fully responsible for their cases. The 
reforms have also introduced a system of recording “interference with 
cases by insiders of judicial organs,” which while rarely utilized, 
further discourages court leaders from intervening in cases handled by 
frontline judges. 
Most interviewed judges and lawyers recognized that these 
reforms have reduced external influence on courts cases, especially in 
the vast majority of regular cases that do not involve extraordinarily 
high monetary or political interests. While this has led to a less corrupt 
and law-based adjudication process across regions, interviewees also 
acknowledged that court leaders can still use informal influence over 
their subordinates to interfere with cases. Such interference, however, 
is mostly limited to cases with high economic or political stakes. 
However, the reforms have also increased the rates of similar cases 
treated differently and opinions containing legal errors because the old 
approval process can no longer function as a check. 
In addition to their effects on the judiciary’s functioning, these 
reforms are likely to have broader implications for China’s judicial 
politics, particularly the relationship between courts and local 
governments (and/or local Communist Party apparatus). The 
accountability reforms have weakened the traditional chain of 
command that enabled local officials to convey their preferences about 
court outcomes to frontline judges. According to Li, the typical 
intervention process previously worked like this: a government or Party 
leader would give instructions to a court leader, and the court leader 
would relay the instructions down the chain until they reached a 
frontline judge, who would then implement them.125 Because frontline 
judges were merely considered agents of their superiors, they would 
normally not be held accountable for carrying out these instructions.126 
By eliminating the case approval system and limiting the use of 
adjudication committees, the accountability reforms make it 
considerably harder for court leaders to dictate the outcomes of cases 
handled by frontline judges, thus undermining the link between 
officials and court cases. That said, it is likely that government and 
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Party officials can still control cases that involve extraordinarily large 
economic or political stakes, as even following the reforms, most such 
cases fall into the jurisdiction of the adjudication committees. 
In sum, although far from the all-around success claimed by the 
Supreme People’s Court,127 the accountability reforms have made 
considerable inroads towards promoting judges’ autonomy and 
accountability—at least for the time being. This conclusion defies the 
prediction that local embeddedness would substantially hamper the 
implementation of the reforms. This Article does, however, confirm 
some of the bases for those predictions. For example, it validates Zhu’s 
claim about the advantages of the vertical hierarchy,128 as the 
accountability reforms have indeed created a problem with low-quality 
opinions and inconsistent rulings in local courts. The study also shows 
that the reforms have substantially undermined many judges’ and court 
leaders’ means to shirk responsibility and their opportunities for 
corruption, which unavoidably contributes to the unpopularity of the 
reforms within the judiciary. However, these obstacles only make the 
reforms’ largely steadfast implementation seem all the more 
significant. 
Interestingly, what enables the accountability reforms to 
overcome the seemly impenetrable local embeddedness is the regime’s 
increasingly monolithic nature. If not for the sweeping anti-corruption 
campaign and the subsequent centralization of political power, many 
reform measures will likely be disregarded in practice, especially in 
more rural and underdeveloped regions. Here lies one of the great 
ironies surrounding the Chinese judiciary: as shown by the turn against 
law under the politically fragmented—and consequently more 
liberal—Hu Jintao administration129 and the progress of the recent 
reforms, the enhancement of the courts’ power and autonomy does not 
seem to depend on the liberalization of the political system, but rather 
on the power consolidation within the already authoritarian 
government. This seemingly paradoxical relationship compels 
researchers to reevaluate the diverse roles contemporary authoritarian 
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